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This paper discusses opportunities and policy options for African countries seeking innovation and learning based 
development strategies. What kind of policies and institutions are necessary in order to transform the current increase in 
rents from commodities exports into industrial investment and upgrading of agriculture and agro-industrial development? 
This question is raised in the context of competing theories about economic development. On the basis of empirical 
patterns and theoretical considerations we discuss policy options in relation to the African reality. 
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Introduction
Recent press reports suggest that Africa may now be at a 
turning point in terms of economic growth and develop-
ment. These reports point out that, although starting from 
a low base, Africa is now the world’s fastest growing 
continent (The Economist 2013). However, naïve 
optimism on this ground should be avoided (Karuri-Sebina 
et al. 2012). The recent growth has been concentrated in 
particular countries and sectors and the transformation of 
growth into sustainable social and economic progress will 
not happen automatically.
There is thus a discrepancy between the reporting of 
record growth rates for African economies in the media 
and the reality of how people’s living conditions have 
evolved over the last decade in the African high growth 
economies. The widely shared understanding among 
development scholars that registered economic growth 
and development must be seen as two distinct, even if 
related, processes has become more evident than ever. 
In this paper we will argue that in order to transform 
the economic upswing as measured by gross domestic 
product, fast-growing African countries need structural 
and institutional change across the economic, social and 
political spheres that bring them closer to what we will 
refer to as ‘learning economies’.
The widening of the gap between reality on the ground 
and perceptions based on growth rates refl ects partly 
that the increasing global demand for natural resources 
– especially for commodities such as oil and minerals –
has led to advantageous change in terms of trade and to 
increased export volumes and raised the rates of GNP 
growth while the impact upon domestic employment 
has often been limited and sometimes negative. The 
expansion of the commodity sector does not automati-
cally create large-scale employment directly and so 
far it has rarely resulted in a substantial increase in job 
creation in upstream and downstream manufacturing and 
in knowledge based services.
It has even been argued, that the structural change 
that occurred in low income economies with high rates of 
growth had a negative impact upon the potential for future 
aggregate economic growth (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). 
They have pointed to the fact that the share of low produc-
tive workplaces, many of them in informal sector activi-
ties or in subsistence agriculture, has grown in the midst 
of the period of rapid growth. This has gone hand in hand 
with de-industrialisation – the share of the labour force in 
manufacturing has fallen from an already low level.
We will take this as starting point for an analysis of 
opportunities and policy options for African countries 
seeking innovation and learning based development strate-
gies (Muchie 2003). What kind of policies and institutions 
are necessary in order to transform the current increase 
in rents from commodities exports into industrial invest-
ment and upgrading of agriculture and agro-industrial 
development?
This question is raised in the context of competing 
theories about economic development. We contrast 
the recommendations of neoclassical economists with 
those that can be derived from the classical develop-
ment economics that includes scholars such as Dobb, 
Hirschman and Sen. The theoretical perspective that we 
propose on this basis takes into account that we have 
entered a phase – the learning economy – where it is 
useful to take as starting point that ‘learning’ is at the core 
of any process of development. Development is a process 
where individuals and organisations learn to do new 
things and learn to do them in new ways in conjunction 
with structural transformation. At the core of the process 
of development is competence building. In the paper we 
analyse development and learning at the micro, macro and 
meso-level.
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On the basis of empirical patterns and theoretical 
considerations we will discuss policy options in relation 
to the African reality. This is not easy. First, there are 
major differences between African countries – there is 
not one strategy that fi ts all. Second, in many African 
countries the most fundamental barriers for development 
are socio-political rather than techno-economic. Here 
political transformations must go hand in hand with socio-
economic and technological transformations. Finally, as 
outsiders to the African scene we can refer to lessons from 
other parts of the world and sketch dilemmas and alterna-
tive options, but the relevance of these lessons needs to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis and the specifi c strategies 
need to be built on the basis of local experience. 
Recent developments in Africa’s economies
Growth and structural change
In a recent contribution, Valensisi and Davis (2011) 
analyse recent patterns of growth and structural change 
in the least developed economies, including most of the 
south of Sahara countries. They refer to the rapid growth 
between 2000 and 2009 – on average GNP has grown 
by 7% per annum. They show that even average GDP 
per capita increased by as much as 5.5% (growth was 
unevenly distributed so median growth for this group 
of countries was 2.2%). The authors make an effort to 
go behind this observed pattern of growth in order to 
understand the underlying structural change process.
They fi nd that the impressive growth record was based 
upon rapid growth in the exports of hard commodities and 
on a capital infl ow (FDI, ODA and remittances infl ow) 
that allowed for a strong growth in consumer demand for 
services and for imported consumer goods. Agriculture 
grew only slowly and in most of the least developed 
economies there was deindustrialisation (in two thirds of 
the least developed economies the share of manufacturing 
was reduced from its already modest level).
The growth process and the increased demand for 
natural resource-based commodities did not lead to any 
increase in the investment ratio – on average the rate of 
investment remained close to 20%. Most of the extra 
income was absorbed by middle-class consumption and in 
many African countries (38 out of 49) imports grew more 
than exports. One problem with this pattern of growth is 
that it does not create suffi cient number of decent jobs for 
the many young people in Africa. Another problem is that 
it establishes a vulnerable economic structure where the 
whole economy is dependent on single hard commodity 
export products. 
Insufficient job creation and poverty reduction 
The UN 2013 Economic report on Africa recognises 
the problems with the current lopsided growth pattern 
– it is presented under the heading ‘Making the Most of
Africa’s Commodities: Industrializing for Growth, Jobs 
and Economic Transformation’. It points out that the 
employment problem remains unsolved in most African 
countries. 
Strong growth across the continent has not been translated 
into the broad-based economic and social development 
needed to lift millions of Africans out of poverty and 
reduce the wide inequalities seen in most countries. This 
is because Africa’s recent growth, driven by primary 
commodities, has low employment intensity – that is, the 
ability to generate jobs (ECA and AUC, 2010).
Thus the continent continues to suffer from high 
unemployment, particularly for youth and female 
populations, with too few opportunities to absorb new 
labour market entrants …
More than 70 per cent of Africans earn their living from 
vulnerable employment as economies continue to depend 
heavily on production and export of primary commodities. 
Investments remain concentrated in capital-intensive 
extractive industries, with few forward and backward 
linkages with the rest of the economy (United Nations 
2013, 30).
The report also points out that the impact of growth on 
poverty reduction has been modest:
Recent data show some slight improvement in poverty 
reduction, even though the region will not be able to 
achieve the related MDGs. The proportion of people 
living in extreme poverty (below $1.25 a day) in Africa 
(excluding North Africa) has been projected to reach 35.8 
per cent in 2015 against the previous forecasts of 38 per 
cent (UN, 2011). This slight, albeit slow, improvement is 
partly attributable to high and sustained economic growth 
since 2000 (United Nations 2013, 35).
The general picture is that the growth in global demand 
for natural resource based commodities – especially hard 
commodities such as minerals – has driven growth in 
the high growth economies in Africa. Combined with an 
infl ow of fi nancial resources this has stimulated private 
consumption of domestic services and imported manufac-
tured goods. The employment impact and the impact in 
terms of poverty reduction have been very limited. A third 
problem is that the kind of structural change that has taken 
place with de-industrialisation, growth in urban informal 
employment and stagnating productivity in agricul-
ture may undermine the prospects of future economic 
development.
Growth-reducing structural change 
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) pursue a simple exercise 
where they break down the observed aggregate growth in 
labour productivity into two components for the period 
1990–2005. One component reflects productivity growth 
within sectors and the second component is the effect 
that comes from moving labour from sectors with low to 
sectors with high levels of productivity. According to the 
authors, African countries have been characterised by a 
trend-wise move of labour from high to low productivity 
sectors (including urban informal sectors). This is what 
the authors refer to as growth-reducing structural change.
This observation goes against what should be expected 
since productivity gaps between sectors are extremely 
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big in the least developed countries. Therefore we would 
expect that economic development takes the form of 
workers moving from low to high productivity sectors. 
But actually the opposite takes place in most of the 
observed countries. Exceptions are Ghana and Ethiopia, 
where structural change made a positive contribution to 
economic growth. According to McMillan and Rodrik, 
to change the dominant negative direction there is a need 
to direct investment to manufacturing and especially 
to expand manufacturing activities with more value 
added to the products. According to the authors, fl exible 
labour markets should help. Below we will propose more 
ambitious policies related to building learning economies 
as a response.
National technological capabilities in Africa
Mayor et al. (2012) have made an attempt to map the 
distribution of technological capabilities in Africa. 
The analysis covers 30 African countries for the years 
2010–2011 and the data used emanate from World 
Economic Forum, either from statistical sources or from an 
executive survey. Technological capabilities are presented 
in three dimensions: (a) The available base (internet 
use, educated labour and R&D). (b) Government and 
business technological effort (technological infrastructure, 
enterprise performance and policies related to innovation). 
(c) Results (patents and IPR-regime).
The analysis leads the authors to defi ne four clusters of 
countries where South Africa stands alone as lead country 
followed by Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. The countries 
with the weakest technological capacities are Algeria, 
Libya, Mauretania and Zimbabwe. It should be taken into 
account that most of the data emanate from surveys with 
business leaders and that there might be a bias in favour 
of regimes that do not intervene with regulating business 
activities.
Nonetheless, the analysis illustrates that Africa is 
heterogeneous and that different countries face different 
challenges when it comes to develop and make use of 
technological capabilities. It is also worth noting that 
almost all of the lead countries have experienced political 
turmoil recently. We are going to turn back to this later 
since it indicates that investments in upgrading the skills 
of the young generation that are not followed by economic 
opportunities may lead to discontent and unrest.
What is development?
A neoclassical theory of development
If we start from neo-classical economics and deduce how 
less developed countries may catch up, the focus of policy 
intervention would be on institutional design aiming at 
well-defined private property rights, including intellec-
tual property rights. It would certainly recommend ubiqui-
tous introduction of the market mechanism, it would 
propagate private ownership and recommend keeping the 
public sector as small as possible. It would advise against 
protectionism and tampering with international trade and 
capital flows. The role of government should be limited to 
secure a stable macroeconomic context and to guarantee 
private property, including intellectual property.
In cases of obvious market failure, government may 
be allowed to intervene. For instance, scientifi c informa-
tion may be seen as a public good and therefore require 
state production or subsidy.  But generally governments 
should stay out of the economic process and leave it to the 
market to give signals to actors. Specifi cally, there would 
be a strong emphasis upon the advantages of free trade. 
Through the free working of comparative advantages, 
resources would be used in the most effi cient way. Since 
all countries have equal access to information, including 
technology, we would expect a general tendency toward 
convergence in productivity and living standards. This 
‘neoclassical theory of development’ lies behind what has 
been called the Washington Consensus. 
Recent history demonstrates that most of the countries 
that have built their strategy on the assumptions of 
neoclassical theory have failed to develop and that most 
of those that have prospered, especially those in Asia, 
have deviated from these ideas. Going further back in 
history it is obvious that the rich countries did not become 
rich by following the neoclassical prescriptions. They 
protected their industries and they showed little respect 
for intellectual property rights. Actually it was almost a 
rule that countries emulated technologies developed in 
other countries often with such success that they became 
technology leaders. But the theory and the prescriptions 
remain very much alive since they are strongly supported 
by powerful global interest groups and institutions rooted 
in the developed countries.
The book by Stiglitz, Lin and Patel (2013) on 
industrial policy in Africa offers a modifi ed version of the 
neo-classical development theory that uses the frequency 
of market failure and not least the importance of 
knowledge and learning as arguments for a more selective 
and interventionist industrial policy. Actually, it argues 
that neo-classical economics has accepted that industrial 
policy is now not only acceptable but also commend-
able. It may be noted that the authors say nothing about 
infant industries and trade and that there is a tendency to 
recommend moderate interventions with full respect for 
‘comparative advantage’.
Development economics 
In the late 1940s there was a growing interest to try to 
explain and remedy economic underdevelopment. One of 
the first important contributions that triggered the debate 
was Rosenstein Rodan (1946). The basic question was: 
How could the poor countries catch up with rich countries? 
The debate was quite polarised. Some of the literature 
came from Marxists who saw global inequality as rooted 
in an imperialist system and assumed that the only way 
for poor countries to grow rich was a transformation 
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toward a socialist and centrally planned economy. Others 
belonging to the liberal camp took the opposite view and 
saw underdevelopment as reflecting that markets were not 
free and that capitalist institutions were not sufficiently 
well established. 
A group of scholars with mixed ideological 
background – Arthur Lewis, Rosenstein Rodan, Lewis, 
Singer, Maurice Dobb, Amartya Sen, Albert Hirschman 
and others – came with more complex prescriptions for 
how poor countries could grow rich. They proposed that 
fi ve elements were absolutely essential for development:
1. A high rate of savings and investments
2. A first stage of import substitution increasingly to be
combined with expansion of exports
3. Absorbing technological knowledge from abroad
4. Focus upon expanding the manufacturing sector
5. An active role for the state in guiding the direction of
development.
It is interesting to note that in the countries that were
the most successful and competitive entrants in the world 
economy, Japan, Korea and China, all the fi ve elements 
were present. But it is also true that in other parts of 
the world the attempts to combine import substitution 
with learning from abroad were much less successful in 
developing self-propelling industrial growth – at least in 
the long term. The less successful examples were often 
countries in Latin America and Africa with higher degrees 
of inequality and with political systems that invested less 
in building the domestic knowledge base necessary to 
learn from abroad.  
So one cannot say that the theory was ever proven to 
be wrong. Rather, the experience indicated that while the 
fi ve conditions listed might be necessary they were not 
suffi cient. In the meantime international organisations 
such as the World Bank, IMF and OECD dominated by 
the USA set conditions for loans and assistance that made 
realising the conditions very diffi cult to those developing 
countries that became (made themselves) dependent on 
loans and grants.
Aggregate growth and structural change
Macroeconomists sometimes assume that economic 
growth takes place as in a corn economy with only one 
sector. They do so in order to keep things simple and make 
advanced mathematical modelling possible. This perspec-
tive misses out the very fundamental fact that growth and 
structural change are two sides of the same coin (Pasinetti 
1980). Aggregate growth will reflect the uneven growth 
rates in different sectors in the economy – and in national 
accounts the growth of the whole is actually a weighted 
sum of the growth of its parts. 
In this context Kutsnetz (1966) makes a very elemen-
tary but often neglected point. He shows that high rates of 
aggregate growth typically require that the big sectors grow 
rapidly. Even if a new sector grows very rapidly its contri-
bution to aggregate growth will, to begin with, be modest. 
Therefore accelerating growth in the currently dominating 
sectors – such as agriculture or the urban informal service 
sector in Africa – is an obvious way to raise income per 
capita in the short to medium term. A typical pattern of 
growth for the rich countries has been to raise productivity 
in agriculture while workers have moved from agriculture 
to manufacturing. In Africa, raising the productivity in the 
informal sector and to create demand for labour outside the 
informal sector is a major challenge.
This is important since the informal sector remains 
a signifi cant and even expanding economic force in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The sector is estimated to account 
for more than 65 percent of non-farm employment in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Adams et al. 2013). In Tanzania the 
informal sector is estimated to account for more than 55% 
of employment in urban areas and over the 2001–2006 
period the number of workers in the informal sector 
increased at an annual rate of 9% as compared to 4% for 
the economy as a whole (Kahyarara and Rutasitara, 2009). 
It is obvious that a successful industrialisation strategy 
would reduce the relative weight of the informal sector in 
the long term. Given its current weight in the sub-Saharan 
economies, measures to upgrade workers’ skills and 
the technologies used in the informal sector would give 
substantial contributions to growth and welfare. The 
same is of course true for agriculture, which is the other 
major sector in terms of employment in most of the least 
developed economies.
But it is equally true that in the long term the 
emergence and growth of new sectors is crucial for the 
wealth of the nation. The ideal new sectors would be 
characterised by rapid technological learning, increasing 
returns to scale and increasing world demand. And it must 
to some degree build upon already existing domestic 
competence in the labour force and in enterprises. It may 
be a problem to foster such new sectors when traditional 
big sectors have strong representation in the political 
system – cf. soy producers in Argentina and the oil 
industry in the Northern Africa. Finding ways to align the 
interests of dominating sectors with the formation of new 
sectors may be necessary to overcome such barriers.
One of the most fundamental questions now debated 
among innovation scholars is what role natural resources-
based sectors and especially those producing hard 
commodities such as minerals, oil and gas can play in a 
process of industrial transformation. Is it correct that such 
sectors offer less potential for technological learning and 
for building upstream and downstream couplings as well 
as lateral transfer of knowledge to other sectors? Or does 
this version of the ‘resource curse’ view just represent 
left-overs from the classical development economists? 
Do new perspectives on how local fi rms can link up to 
global value chains make these views obsolete? Another 
relevant question is if it is possible to create suffi cient 
volume of new jobs for the young generation without 
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industrialisation. We return to these questions in the last 
sections of the paper.
Learning, innovation and development
Stiglitz (2011) proposes that there is a need to engage 
in ‘Rethinking development economics’. It is remark-
able that he builds his argument around the concept 
‘the learning society’ – a concept that has been central 
among innovation scholars for many years. Brændgaard 
et al. (1992) presented ideas for innovation policy in the 
learning society in the context of the analysis of national 
systems of innovation (Lundvall 1992). Two years later 
Lundvall and Johnson (1994) developed further this 
concept under the heading ‘the learning economy’. As 
pointed out in Lundvall et al. (2009), several scholars such 
as Viotti (2003) have proposed to refer to national learning 
systems in developing countries rather than to present 
them as national innovation systems. In this section we 
will present a perspective on development that is rooted in 
our interpretation of the concept ‘the learning economy’. 
An ambitious defi nition of development must refer 
not only to registered economic growth and structural 
change. We should also take into account the welfare of 
individuals and how resources and capacities are distrib-
uted among individuals, regions and classes. It also needs 
to take into account long-term generational perspectives. 
Such a defi nition would take into account both material 
conditions and mental and spiritual conditions, including 
positive and negative experiences from being a member of 
traditional and new communities. It would need to refl ect 
experiences from different roles in life such as the roles of 
consumer, family member, citizen and worker. Short-term 
gains should be weighed against long-term costs and 
foregone opportunities – such as environmental degrada-
tion and depletion of non-reproducible natural resources.
Here we are going to be more modest and bring in 
two dimensions that tend to be neglected in the traditional 
view on development and economic growth. The fi rst 
refers to the quality of working life while the second refers 
to the crucial role of the uneven capacity to learn and the 
uneven access to learning. The most primitive versions of 
welfare economics assume that increasing the bundle of 
consumption goods is basically what constitutes increased 
welfare. This is why national income per capita is the most 
frequently used indicator. The perspective is implicit in the 
argument in favour of free trade combined with ‘fl exible’ 
work arrangements. 
For instance, while the positive impact of globalisa-
tion on consumption opportunities is taken into account, 
possible negative consequences upon job security and 
working conditions are neglected. This traditional 
perspective is especially problematic when it comes 
to assessing economic development in Africa, where 
increasing consumption opportunities for the middle class 
seems have gone hand-in-hand with more vulnerable 
employment and less quality in working life for the 
majority of workers.
In order to understand the importance of learning, it is 
useful to start from Amartya Sen’s defi nition of welfare as 
‘freedoms’ and capabilities to realise what you regard as 
valuable. This is, in general, a valuable approach because 
it takes into account that the aspirations of people may 
be different in different countries and regions. We would 
nonetheless, in this context, like to emphasise ‘access 
to learning’ as perhaps the most fundamental freedom – 
especially in a society characterised by rapid change in 
people’s private and professional lives. The two concepts 
learning and development are crucially interconnected, 
both at the individual level and at other levels of the 
economy – learning organisations, learning regions and 
the learning economy at the aggregate level. There are two 
reasons why we should focus upon learning.
First, a crucial prerequisite for any kind of economic 
transformation is a speed-up of learning as competence 
building, both among individuals and within organisa-
tions. Structural change is a process where people are 
confronted with new tasks. Second, we would argue that 
learning is not only of instrumental value, enhancing the 
productivity of the individual worker. It is also of substan-
tive value for individuals. This is obvious for the child’s 
development into adulthood. To block the child’s process 
of learning to communicate and act in society would be 
cruel. For most adults a life without any learning would 
constitute monotony.
This perspective does not rule out that the speed of 
learning imposed by circumstances may become disturb-
ingly high and create stress and suffering, especially 
when the individuals have no capabilities to understand 
and manage the processes involved. Neither does it mean 
that all forms of learning represent progress. And learning 
new things implies that old knowledge becomes obsolete. 
Learning as well as development will always involve 
creative destruction. As new patterns take form, old ones 
tend to be destroyed. Often the old patterns are seen as 
positive by some of those living in the society. In worst 
cases, destruction takes place without much creation. 
While some form of creative destruction is necessary 
to lift African people out of poverty, the involvement of 
ordinary citizens in the management of change would 
make the processes of change and learning less painful. 
Stiglitz (2011) argues that there is another kind of link 
from a learning economy perspective to inclusive develop-
ment. His argument is the correct observation that the 
learning society will be most successful when learning 
is broad based and knowledge is widely spread in the 
economy. In a series of papers on the learning economy 
we have presented a somewhat different perspective where 
we have showed that, if left to itself, the learning economy 
tends to become increasingly polarised (Lundvall 1996, 
Lundvall 2002). Only with strong and systematic govern-
ment intervention aiming at strengthening the capacity of 
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weak learners and offering them better access to learning 
is it possible to build strong learning societies.
Transformation pressure, learning capacity and 
redistribution 
In a context of global competition, national economies 
as well as firms are exposed to a more or less intense 
‘transformation pressure’. For instance, the strong 
competition from China has put a very intense transfor-
mation pressure on manufacturing firms in Africa. The 
transformation pressure at the level of the manufacturing 
firm can be reduced in different ways. For instance, 
workers may accept lower wages, the currency may be 
devalued or government may introduce trade barriers to 
protect the domestic firms in order to promote import 
substitution. An alternative is that the firms are left to 
themselves to cope with the intensification of the transfor-
mation pressure. They might do so by downscaling or 
bankruptcy. Alternatively they may respond by engaging 
in organisational and technological learning, resulting in 
a stronger competitiveness based upon higher productivity 
and incremental product and process innovations.
When the transformation pressure is growing, it 
speeds up structural change in the national innovation 
system. Low productivity activities will be closed down. 
With a suffi cient population of fi rms with a capacity to 
innovate and adapt, the resources that are freed up from 
the fi rms closing down will be absorbed by these new 
or growing high productivity activities. But with a weak 
learning capacity at the level of fi rms, the result will be 
further increase in underemployment in informal activi-
ties and unemployment. How the costs and benefi ts of the 
transformation are distributed affects how willing people 
will be to contribute actively to the process of transforma-
tion within the fi rms. The response at the national level 
will refl ect the strength of the national innovation and 
competence building system.
Why we need to broaden the innovation system concept
One major difference between neoclassical economics 
and evolutionary economics is that in the evolutionary 
perspective, history and institutions matter (Nelson 1993). 
The national system of innovation (NSI) concept signals 
that the economic structure and the current institutional 
setup, both with historical roots, need to be analysed and 
understood in order to set policy priorities. However, it is 
obvious that different authors mean different things when 
referring to a national system of innovation. Some major 
differences have to do with the focus of the analysis and 
with how broad the definition is in relation to institutions 
and markets.
Authors from the USA with a background in studying 
science and technology policy tend to focus the analysis 
on ‘the innovation system in the narrow sense’. They tend 
to regard the NSI-concept as a follow-up and broadening 
of earlier analyses of national science systems and national 
technology policies (see for instance the defi nition given 
in Mowery and Oxley 1995, 80). The focus is upon the 
systemic relationships between R&D efforts in fi rms, 
science and technology (S&T) organisations including 
universities, and public policy. 
Freeman (1987) developed a broader concept that took 
into account national specifi cities in how fi rms organise 
innovative activities – he emphasised, for example, how 
Japanese fi rms increasingly used ‘the factory as labora-
tory’. Researchers at Aalborg (Lundvall 1985; Andersen 
and Lundvall 1988) also developed a concept of innova-
tion systems where there are other major sources of 
innovation than science. Innovation is seen as refl ecting 
interactive learning taking place in connection with 
on-going activities in production and sales. Therefore the 
analysis takes its starting point in the process of produc-
tion and the process of product development, assuming, 
for instance, that the interaction with users is fundamental 
for product innovation.
None of these approaches, however, gave suffi cient 
attention to the broader set of institutions shaping 
competence building in the economy, such as labour 
markets, the education and training system, and their 
relation to systems of corporate governance. Nor did 
they consider the broader connections between these 
institutional subsystems and national political cultures 
and welfare regimes. In order to capture this wider set of 
interactions in a dynamic perspective, we introduce an 
evolutionary framework for analysing how economies 
learn under the pressure of globalisation.
Mediating transformation pressure 
The starting premise is that a range of factors have 
resulted in an acceleration of economic change. These 
factors include economic globalisation, policies and 
demands of international institutions such as deregula-
tion of finance, population growth, technological change, 
etc. In many African countries the boom in commodi-
ties exports adds to these factors. When the transforma-
tion pressure becomes more intense it means that firms 
will have to engage in change in terms of organisation, 
technology and capability if they want to survive and 
grow. At the level of the labour market, this process will 
be reflected in dynamics where workers will gain, lose or 
change jobs while learning new (and forgetting old) skills 
and competences.
A crucial characteristic of a national system is how it 
responds to an increase in transformative pressure. The 
capability to innovate and to adapt will refl ect systemic 
features having to do with how easy it is to establish 
interactive learning within and across organisational 
borders (social capital) and with the preparedness to 
take risks (entrepreneurship). Organisational capabili-
ties and the competence structure of the workforce play 
an important role. Social cohesion may be an important 
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factor behind social capital while it might get in the way 
of entrepreneurship.
The mechanism for redistribution of costs and benefi ts 
emanating from change differs between national systems. 
Figure 1 below is adapted from the framework developed 
in Archibugi and Lundvall (2000) to link transformation 
pressure to the capacity to innovate and to the distribution 
of cost and benefi ts of change. 
The view developed in the book is that capabilities 
to innovate and to adapt refl ect systematic differences 
in national institutional arrangements at the levels of the 
science and technology system, labour markets, education 
and training, and fi nance. These institutional subsystems 
will impact on how knowledge is developed and used 
within organisations and these organisational differences 
in turn will have a bearing on innovation pace (fast or 
slow) and innovation style (incremental or radical).
But national differences in innovation systems need 
to be seen in an even broader perspective and take into 
account feedbacks from the distribution of costs and 
benefi ts to the capacity to innovate and to adapt. An 
uneven distribution may create a negative attitude to 
change among those who mainly register the costs and 
if there are high degrees of insecurity among individuals 
they will tend to oppose change. 
A second kind of feedback mechanism goes from the 
ability to innovate to transformation pressure. Increasing 
the ability to innovate involves stimulation of entrepre-
neurship and the building of more fl exible organisations. 
This implies a selection of people and institutions that are 
more change oriented and this further increases transfor-
mation pressure.
Development strategies responding to transformation 
pressures 
The simple model presented above can be used to distin-
guish between different developmental strategies. The 
Washington Consensus based upon neoclassical assump-
tions recommends that governments leave it to the market 
to determine the transformation pressure and to install 
a capacity to adapt through flexible labour markets. 
Redistribution of costs and benefits of change should be 
kept at a minimum in order not to get prices and incentives 
wrong.
The development economists (Singer, Dobb and Sen) 
saw a need for less developed economies to regulate the 
transformation pressure shielding new industries from the 
full impact of international competition. It is interesting 
to note that they as well as the fathers of the concept 
of ‘infant industry argument’ (Hamilton and List) saw 
strengthening of the knowledge base of the economy as 
another necessary prerequisite for economic development. 
Friedrich List thus insisted that ‘mental capital’ was 
more important for development than physical or fi nancial 
capital. The emphasis upon intangible capital, knowledge 
and technology has become even more clear in recent 
theories of economic development pointing to ‘capabili-
ties’ and innovation systems as crucial for economic 
development. In the next section we will go deeper 
into how knowledge and learning links to economic 
development.
As we remarked above, the Asian countries were more 
successful in using the protective strategy than countries 
in Latin America and Africa, where the result was stagna-
tion rather than economic growth. One explanation is that 
there was too little emphasis upon building innovation 
capacity, that the protection from competition from abroad 
was not compensated by other mechanisms stimulating 
competition and that income and access to land were more 
inequally distributed in Africa and Latin America. 
Macro conditions for development
The general macroeconomic situation will affect the 
capacity of firms to engage in investment and innovation. 
This is one of the points where there is agreement among 
those belonging to the Washington Consensus camp and 
Transformative pressure
Financial system
Science and 
technology 
system 
Labour market 
institutions
Education and 
training system
Capacity to innovate 
and to adapt to 
change
Redistribution of costs 
and benefits of change
Figure 1: A model linking transformation pressure to the 
capacity to change and to the distribution of the costs and 
benefits of change 
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those in favour of selective industrial policies promoting 
innovation. But there are differences in terms of focus. 
Washington Consensus recommendations only propose 
financial discipline and stable prices. This perspective 
neglects that innovation is to some degree demand-driven 
and that engaging in entrepreneurial activities is much less 
risky in a situation when aggregate demand is growing. 
Also the neoliberals propose to leave it to the market to 
regulate finance, something that results both in more 
instability and in very limited access to loans especially 
for small and medium enterprises.
Investment and finance
One of the most fundamental weaknesses of national 
innovation systems is the financial system. In most of the 
least developed countries, access to capital for supporting 
ordinary trade, for investments in production capacity and 
especially for new innovative ventures is very limited. 
Banks do not have the routines or skills to deal with more 
risky projects and neither have government authorities.
Therefore the creation of new public-private institu-
tions fi lling the function of development banks is crucial. 
This would require building new competence and here 
South–South learning could play an important role. 
Among the sources of fi nance to be channelled into the 
new institutions could be export levies on non-renewable 
hard commodities. 
Educated labour
It is obvious that education is an important prerequisite 
for economic development. This can be seen from the 
historical record of developed economies and from the 
recent growth of Asian countries. Basic education offering 
literacy and basic mathematical skills may be seen as 
fundamental human rights since such skills are necessary 
for full participation in society. Secondary and tertiary 
levels are of course important for economic and social 
development.
A major problem is that the demand for candidates 
with higher education is very limited in the least developed 
countries. This leads to an exodus of highly educated 
people to the rich countries and in this way the scarce 
resources invested in universities end up not being used in 
the less developed countries. The 2012 UNCTAD report 
on the least developed countries has a theme the issues of 
brain drain and brain gain and also on how remittances 
from emigrants may be mobilised for development.
The report shows that the outfl ow of highly trained 
people from the least developed countries increased 
1990–2000 and that it has kept growing in the new 
millennium. For many African countries the brain drain 
rate (the brain drain rate is the emigrants’ share of the 
corresponding age and educational group in the home 
country) is over 40%. This is for instance true for Uganda, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Gambia.
While the report discusses possible advantages of 
having a diaspora of trained people abroad, there is little 
doubt that the outfl ow of skilled people from the poorest to 
the richest countries (the USA remains the main destina-
tion) is unfair and undermines development efforts in the 
home countries.
The main reason for the exodus of skilled people is 
lack of job opportunities and very big differences in 
earnings between home country and host country. In a 
paper on higher education, innovation and economic 
development (Lundvall 2008), we showed that the lack of 
demand refl ects absence of innovation and that therefore 
investments in higher education need to be coordinated 
with and supported by framework conditions and policies 
that stimulate innovation. The higher the rate of innova-
tion is, the higher is the rate of return on investments in 
higher education.
It is also a serious problem that the education system 
replicates elements from the former colonial powers. 
Universities train people with a strong emphasis on social 
science and humanities, while there is a tendency to 
neglect the training of vocational skills and engineering. 
Emphasis is upon narrowly defi ned scientifi c disciplines 
and higher education institutions often operate as 
academies with very limited elements of practical training. 
Introducing problem-based learning and elements of 
practice in theoretical studies may reduce the problem of 
creating jobs for the candidates. 
Public policy and institutional design
As pointed out in the introduction, there are strict limits 
for what external experts can offer when it comes to 
design and implement public policy schemes and when 
it comes to design new institutions that support economic 
development. In what follows we refer to what seems to 
work in other contexts and what we see as general princi-
ples for promoting development.
Non-discrimination as development strategy
Taking the learning economy perspective on economic 
development makes it clear that the inclusive formation of 
people skills and their interaction is crucial. In many of 
the least developed economies, including those in Africa 
there is discrimination to ethnic minorities and to women 
in terms of access to resources and citizen rights. A focus 
on reducing discrimination when it comes to learning – 
not only in terms of access to formal education – but also 
processes of learning in production and policy processes 
expands the access to human resources and creativity. In 
many societies the inclusion of women and ethnic minori-
ties can offer new potential and more commitment to 
economic processes.
A specifi c problem in Africa is the age structure, with 
a strong overweight of young people. Developing new 
institutions that give young people a ‘voice’ in develop-
ment issues may be a way to avoid that the youth get 
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alienated and engage in destructive activities individually 
or collectively, but may be a special challenge in countries 
where there is a tradition to listen most to the old and 
experienced.
Such changes may be crucial also for attracting the 
diaspora intellectuals who often fi nd patriarchy and 
authoritarianism repelling.
Industrial and trade policy
In a recent document from UNCTAD, some general 
principles for economic development are referred to 
(UNCTAD 2012, 132):
In recent years, UNCTAD has repeatedly argued that 
progressive transformation in economic structure is a 
prerequisite for LDCs to achieve accelerated and sustained 
economic growth and poverty reduction. The policies and 
strategies needed to attain structural transformation will 
involve, inter alia, 
(a) the development of a new industrial policy based on 
a strategic approach that refl ects the speciic needs and 
conditions of LDCs; 
(b) a catalytic developmental State to compensate for the 
incipient and weak private sector in LDCs; 
(c) measures to encourage private investment in 
productive activities and public investment in basic 
infrastructure, including the development of skills and 
support institutions; 
(d) the promotion of domestic technological learning and 
innovation and improvements in productivity in both 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors.
Our analysis above supports those principles but 
they are somewhat general to be implemented as such 
and they need to take into account the specifi cities of 
African countries’ specifi c recent development. The UN 
economic report for Africa 2013 moves in that direction 
by demonstrating the limits of the current development 
patterns where natural resource rents are not transformed 
into investment in manufacturing and agriculture.
The UN report points to the formation of ‘industrial 
clusters’ around commodity production on the basis 
of private-public partnerships as the central strategy. 
The advantage with such an incremental strategy is that 
it builds upon what is already there and aims at raising 
productivity in existing activities. 
But there might be a need for more bold industrial 
policy strategies that take the wider perspective of the 
national innovation system and aim at fostering new 
manufacturing industries with high learning potential. 
Here productivity of the whole economy could be 
increased by moving resources from low to high produc-
tivity sectors. 
Industrial policies as learning processes
It is useful to see public policy as a learning process. 
There is no reason to assume that policy makers get things 
right from the very beginning. For instance, we found 
that the original intentions of the Chinese reforms aiming 
at creating ‘markets for knowledge’ did not succeed 
(Lundvall and Gu 2010). The enterprises were not ready to 
procure knowledge from universities and other knowledge 
institutions. Instead, knowledge suppliers had to move 
ahead and establish their own enterprises in order to bring 
knowledge into use. This unintended process turned out to 
be an important step for China in its catch-up process and 
it was accepted as such by policy makers.
When policy makers in African countries take new 
initiatives in industrial policy they should be aware of the 
fact that it is a learning process. This involves system-
atically evaluating outcomes and not least registering 
unexpected outcomes – both positive and negative – and 
making sure that the next wave of initiatives take these 
experiences into account.  
Stiglitz et al. (2013) discuss the argument that 
industrial policy should be avoided in Africa because there 
is too little administrative capacity to pursue industrial 
policy in Africa. They turn down the argument. But 
there is little doubt that there is much for African policy 
makers to learn from successful catching up economies. 
Programmes with expert exchange between African 
countries and some Asian countries could be one way to 
speed up policy learning.
Environmental policy as industrial policy
As the global climate change regime moves ahead 
towards 2020, there will be increasing investments 
related to climate change mitigation and adaptation in 
poor countries. Substantial opportunities for funding of 
low carbon innovations will arise, particularly in Africa. 
Ensuring that the most adequate technologies are selected 
and that they are diffused and used in such a way that the 
outcome is better living conditions for the population is a 
major challenge (Lema et al. 2014).
At the same time environmental policy is an important 
form of industrial policy with potential for job creation. 
Making it more costly to use carbon-based technologies 
and giving support to low carbon solutions will change not 
only the structure of power production but also the wider 
industry structure. Introducing low carbon solutions in 
agriculture and in the informal sector, for instance through 
new systems for recycling and repair activities, can offer 
both investment and job opportunities.
The BRICS connection and below the radar innovation
The most recent developments in Africa with growing 
dependence of production of commodities and a tendency 
toward deindustrialisation reflects the growing role of 
China and other emerging economies. It is major task 
for governments in Africa to exploit the potential for a 
positive interaction with BRICS countries. This potential 
reflects that emerging economies are in a particularly 
strong position to advance relevant and affordable technol-
ogies because conditions in BRICS are more similar to 
those in poor countries. 
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But even the most ‘adequate’ technologies developed 
abroad will need to go through a process of transforma-
tion in order to become both effi cient and inclusive in 
the specifi c context of African countries. The fact that 
solutions may be adequate has little to do with the source 
of the technology but depends on the contextualisation 
and adaptation of the technology into the local context 
(Arocena and Sutz 2000). Building absorptive capacity in 
the informal sector and in agriculture requires new types 
of policy initiatives.
The global regime for knowledge protection and sharing 
Above we could see how very scarce resources used for 
higher education went into investments in people who 
then moved to rich countries that could benefit from the 
investments. The lack of protection of these resources 
can be argued in terms of the need for individual freedom 
to move from one country to another. The argument is 
weakened when it turns out that the rich countries respect 
for this freedom is highly selective. Ordinary poor people 
with less education are effectively blocked at the frontiers 
of the rich countries.
The lack of protection of human capital stands in 
strong contrast to the global rules regarding intellec-
tual property rights. The WTO agreements on TRIPS 
set very strict limits for the use of knowledge developed 
abroad and they have been even further restricted 
by bilateral agreements between the USA and least 
developed countries (Padmashgree and Roffe 2012). The 
WTO agreements also include references to the duty of 
developed countries to engage in technology transfer to 
the least developed economies but those references are 
vague, without monitoring and sanctions.
There is little doubt that the global regime for 
knowledge sharing and protection is biased in favour 
of the rich countries. To renegotiate this regime would 
require a coordinated effort of African countries, perhaps 
with a role for the African Union.
The natural resource curse and the need to promote 
of manufacturing in Africa – some reflections on the 
implications for public policy
The data and conclusions presented under the heading ‘the 
resource curse’ in Sachs and Warner (1995) have triggered 
a substantial amount of analytical work as well as heated 
debate among economists and political scientists. Recently 
the topic has attracted the attention of scholars linking 
innovation and innovation policy to development (see for 
instance Katz 2006; Perez 2010; Lizuka and Soete 2011; 
Lizuka and Katz 2011; Andersen 2012; Morris, Kaplan 
and Kaplinsky 2012: Dantas and Bell 2011; Maleki 2013).
Some early contributions to the resource curse debate 
by economic historians such as Gavin Wright and Paul 
David demonstrated that knowledge creation and learning 
in direct connection with the exploitation of mineral 
resources have been crucial for US economic growth. 
Others such as De Ferranti et al. (2002) have argued that 
the most important explanation of the different paths 
of development where Nordic countries succeeded in 
developing strong and diversifi ed economies starting from 
a situation of natural resources specialisation, while Latin 
America failed to do so, had to do with a weak knowledge 
base and with an institutional setup that did not support 
processes of learning. 
On this basis innovation scholars have argued against 
a specifi c version of the natural resource curse based upon 
assumptions that:
1. The learning potential and the knowledge content is
limited in natural resources-based sectors.
2. Natural resources-based sectors tend to develop as
enclaves with limited capacity to drive the creation of 
upstream and downstream manufacturing.
It is in line with the argument in this paper that the 
key difference between successful and less successful 
growth policies lies in the nature of the learning process 
that promotes the economic potential of access to natural 
resources (Wright 2001). A crucial issue is how natural 
resources-related activities make use of and master new 
technologies and knowledge to improve production 
processes (De Ferranti et al. 2002). A key question is how 
Africa can exploit the ‘window of opportunity’ opened 
up by increased global demand for natural resources and 
transform into a knowledge base that would allow for 
sustained and inclusive growth.
We share the skepticism as to the generalised resource 
curse hypothesis and see the building of clusters around 
natural resources as one useful step toward economic 
development in Africa. But we see a need to develop 
further the policy implications of the criticism. We are 
not convinced that the natural resource base should be 
the only starting point for industrialisation in Africa. The 
fact that most African countries import big proportions of 
their consumption goods from abroad indicates a potential 
for import substitution. Second, we see the broad-based 
growth of manufacturing as crucial for making Africa’s 
economies less vulnerable and for creating jobs for the 
young generation. This is the case even if there is a great 
potential for learning and upgrading in natural resources-
based sectors.
In relation to building clusters around natural 
resources – both mining and agriculture – we see a crucial 
need for building relevant capacity in engineering and 
design. Without local competence in these areas there is no 
possibility to link up with global value chains with unique 
and high value-added products. But the same is true for 
any attempt to build industrial capacity. One important 
reason why the attempts to realise import substitution in 
Latin America and Africa did not succeed is that technical 
training and engineering were given too little attention as 
compared to general education in science, social science 
and humanities.
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Notes
1 This paper was drafted to form the basis for a presen-
tation at the AfricaLics Academy held in Algiers in 
October, 2013. It also draws on a concept note prepared 
by the authors for the Globelics Seminar on Innovation and 
Economic Development, Dar-es-Salaam, March 2012.
2 An important factor is that, daily, thousands of young 
economics students are exposed to programmes teaching 
this message. Many of those working in ministries of 
finance in African countries have been trained to believe in 
it.
3 The fact that the landed aristocracy in England became 
involved in trade and industry was a major factor that made 
the industrial revolution possible.
4 This section draws on Lundvall (2005).
5 To a certain degree, these differences in focus reflect the 
national origin of the analysts. In small countries such as 
Denmark, as in developing countries – a major concern 
of Freeman – it is obvious that the competence base most 
critical for innovation in the economy as a whole is not 
scientific knowledge. Incremental innovation, ‘absorptive 
capacity’ and economic performance will typically reflect 
the skills and motivation of employees as well as inter- 
and intra-organisational relationships and characteristics. 
Science-based sectors may be rapidly growing but their 
shares of total employment and exports remain relatively 
small.
6 In the Anglo-Saxon countries the basic idea is that individ-
uals should carry as much as possible of both benefits 
and costs. In the Nordic countries universal tax-financed 
welfare systems redistribute in favour of individuals that 
lose their jobs or become handicapped. The more conserv-
ative systems in place in Continental European countries 
tend to redistribute through employment-tied public 
insurance systems. In Southern Europe, where systems of 
social protection are relatively weak, the family can still 
play an important role as a redistributing mechanism. In 
Japan the big corporations redistribute resources to older 
workers who would otherwise be victims of change by 
offering them life-long employment.
References
Arocena, R.J. and Sutz J. (2000), Looking at national systems 
of innovation from the South. Industry and Innovation 7(1): 
55–75.
August, O. (2013), Special report: emerging Africa. The 
Economist 406(8825). 
Bell, M. (2007), Technological learning and the development 
of production and innovative capacities in the industry and 
infrastructure sectors of the least developed countries: what 
roles for ODA?’ SPRU Working Paper, Brighton: Science 
and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex.
Cimoli, M., Dosi, G., Nelson, R. and Stiglitz, J. (2007), Policies 
and institutional design in developing economies. Globelics 
Working Paper, No. 2007-04.
Clark, N. and Chataway, J. (2009), Below the radar: a 
fresh approach to innovation and development policy. 
International Journal of Technology Management & 
Sustainable Development 8(3): 171–175.
Dantas, E. and Bell, M. (2011), The co-evolution of 
firm-centered knowledge networks and capabilities 
in late industrialising countries: the case of Petrobras 
in the offshore oil innovation system in Brazil. World 
Development 39(9): 1570–1591.
De Ferranti et al. (2002), From natural resources to the 
knowledge economy: trade and job quality. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
Gault, F. (2008), Science, technology and innovation indicators: 
opportunities for Africa’, African Statistical Journal 6: 
141–162.
Kaplinsky, R. (2011), Schumacher meets Schumpeter: 
Appropriate technology below the radar. Research Policy 
40(2): 193–203.
Karuri-Sebina, G., Sall, A., Maharajh, R. and Segobye, A. 
(2012), Fictions, factors and futures: reflections on Africa’s 
‘impressive growth’. Development 55(4): 491–496.
Kutsnetz, S. (1966), Modern economic growth: rate, structure, 
and spread, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lall, S. and Kraemer-Mbula, E. (2005), Industrial 
competitiveness in Africa: lessons from East Asia. London: 
ITDG.
Lema, R., Johnson, B., Andersen, A.D., Lundvall, B.-Å. and 
Chaudhary, A. (eds.) (2014), Low-carbon innovation and 
development. Globelics Thematic Review. Aalborg: Aalborg 
University Press.
Lema, R. and Lema, A. (2012), Technology transfer? The rise 
of China and India in green technology sectors. Innovation 
and Development 2(1): 23–44.
Lundvall, B.-Å. (ed.) (1992), National systems of innovation: 
towards a theory of innovation and interactive learning. 
London and New York: Pinter Publishers
Lundvall, B.-Å. (2005), National innovation systems – 
analytical concept and development tool. Paper presented 
at the DRUID Tenth Anniversary Summer Conference 2005 
on Dynamics of Industry and Innovation: Organizations, 
Networks and Systems Copenhagen, 27–29 June 2005.
Lundvall, B.-Å., Joseph, K.J., Chaminade, C. and Vang, J. (eds.) 
(2009), Handbook of innovation systems and developing 
countries: building domestic capabilities in a global setting. 
Cheltenham and Northamption, MA: Edward Elgar.
Mayor, M.G.-O., Blasquez de la Hera, M.L. and de Diego Ruiz, 
E. (2012), Empirical study of technological innovation 
capability in Africa. South African Journal of Economic and 
Management Science 15(4): 440–463.
Mcmillan, Margaret S. and Rodrik, D. (2011), Globalization, 
structural change and productivity growth. NBER working 
paper series. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research.
Morris M., Kaplinsky, R. and Kaplan, D. (2012), ‘One thing 
leads to another’. Commodities, linkages and industrial 
development. Resources Policy 37(4): 408–416.
Muchie, M. (2003), Re-thinking Africa’s development 
through the National Innovation System. In Muchie, M., 
Gammeltoft, P. and Lundvall, B.-Å. (eds.). Putting Africa 
first. The making of African innovation systems. Aalborg: 
Aalborg University Press. 
Nelson, R.R. (1993), National innovation systems: a 
comparative study. New York: Oxford University Press.
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B. and Lal, K. (2006), Learning new 
technologies by small and medium enterprises in 
developing countries. Technovation 26(2): 220–231.
Page, J. (2010), Should Africa industrialise? World Institute 
for Development Economics Research, Working Paper, no. 
2011,4.
Salter, W.E.G. (1960), Productivity and Technical Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sachs, J.D. and Warner, AM. (1995), Natural resource 
abundance and economic growth. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper, no. 5398, December. 
466  Lundvall & Lema— African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development 2014, Vol. 6 No. 5, pp. 455–466
Sampath, P.G. and Roffe, P. (2012), Unpacking the international 
technology transfer debate: fifty years and beyond. ICTSD 
Working Paper, June 2012.
Sen, A.K. (1983), Development: which way now?’ Economic 
Journal 93 (December): 745.
Sen, A.K. (1999), Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Stiglitz, J.E. (2011), ‘Rethinking development economics’, 
World Bank Research Observer 26: 230–236.
Stiglitz, J.E., Lin, J. and Patel, E. (2013), Industrial policy in the 
African context. World Bank Working Paper, S6633, World 
Bank.
UNCTAD (2013), The least developed countries report, 2012, 
harnessing remittances and diaspora knowledge to build 
productive capacities, Geneva: UNCTAD.
UNCTAD (2010), Powering development with renewable 
energy technologies. Technology and innovation report. 
New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, United Nations.
UNCTAD (2012), Innovation, technology and South–
South collaboration. Technology and innovation report. 
New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, United Nations.
United Nations (2013), The UN 2013 economic report on 
Africa. New York: United Nations.
Viotti, E.B. (2002), National Learning Systems A new approach 
on technological change in late industrialising economies 
and evidences from the cases of Brazil and South Korea. 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 69: 653–680
Valensisi, G. and Davis, J. (2011), Least developed countries 
and the green transition: towards a renewed political 
economy agenda. Merit Working Paper, November 2011.
Wright, G. (2001), Resources based growth: then and 
now. Paper prepared for the World Bank. Stanford 
University, http://www-iepr.stanford.edu/conferences/
HSTeachers_2001/resource-based-growth.pdf
Click for updates
African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation
and Development
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rajs20
Growth and structural change in Africa: development
strategies for the learning economy
Bengt-Åke Lundvalla & Rasmus Lemaa
a Department of Management and Business Studies, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark
Published online: 02 Jan 2015.
To cite this article: Bengt-Åke Lundvall & Rasmus Lema (2014) Growth and structural change in Africa: development
strategies for the learning economy, African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development, 6:5, 455-466,
DOI: 10.1080/20421338.2014.979660
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20421338.2014.979660
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of
the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied
upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall
not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other
liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or
arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
